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PROPRIETARY RIGHTS AND
WHY INITIAL ALLOCATIONS MATTER
ClarisaLong*
Initial allocations of proprietary rights matter because who starts out
holding the rights helps determine who ends up holding the rights. In patent
law, proprietary rights are granted to those who are first to invent.! But entities
who win the race to patent an invention are not necessarily the final, or best, or
most efficient users of the technology. If proprietary rights, particularly
patents on basic research results, could be traded efficiently so that
downstream innovators could obtain them from initial rights holders easily,
then initial allocations of proprietary rights would not matter so much.
Transferring proprietary rights is costly, however, which often makes it
difficult to achieve the highest and best use of such rights. In addition to
transaction costs, uncertainty over whether patented basic research results can
be turned into commercially viable products can cause bargaining breakdown.
Faced with uncertainty, parties to a licensing transaction may rely on proxies to
establish a value for the patented basic research results. Such proxies may be
driven by the reputation of the initial rights holder rather than by the qualities
of the technology being licensed. The characteristics of the initial rights holder
and the strength of its bargaining position thus become important elements in
determining whether proprietary rights get transferred and if so, under what
terms. Because initial allocations drive final allocations, initial allocations
matter in achieving the best and most efficient use of proprietary rights.
1.
Proprietary rights to the products of biomedical research have been
controversial for quite some time. At first, the debate centered around whether
the products of life were patentable and whether proprietary rights were
desirable and consistent with the norms of science.2 The United States

* Associate Professor ofLaw, University of Virginia School of Law. B.A., University of Illinois (1989);
B.S., University of Illinois (1989); J.D., Stanford University (1994). I would like to thank Lillian Bevier, Julia
Mahoney, and J. Hoult Verkerke for their helpful comments.
1 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
2 Robert K. Merton, The Puritan Spur to Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL &
EMPI.ICAL INVESTIGATION 228 (Robert K. Merton ed., 1973).
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Supreme Court answered the former question definitively in 1980. 3 As for the
latter question, what used to be unthinkable is now routine. Over the past few
decades, norms have evolved to the point where patenting scientific
innovations is practically de rigeur. For example, when DNA-sequencing
techniques were invented in the late 1970s, neither Frederick Sanger4 nor Allan
Maxam and Walter Gilbert -to name a few of the leading lights in the field at
the time-patented the techniques they created for sequencing DNA itself.
When Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer received their patent on recombinant
DNA technology in 1980, this was considered a notable departure from
scientific norms in the academic/research community. 6 The Cohen-Boyer
patent, assigned to Stanford University, was so broad that it had the potential to
slow the development of commercial biotechnology dramatically, had Stanford
University chosen to attempt to extract every last drop of potential revenue
from it.7 The patent was licensed for relatively low fees, but scientistsparticularly basic researchers-nonetheless breathed a sigh of relief in 1997
when the patent expired.
Today, academic patenting, either in conjunction with, or in competition
with, the private sector, is routine.8 Many of these patents have been granted
in the biomedical fields and many patents, whether held by private-sector
entities or research institutions, cover inventions upon which further pathbreaking research and inventions can be built.9 Such patents frequently cover
research results so basic that no commercial end-product is currently
available.' 0 Alternatively, a patented invention may be both a commercial endproduct and the subject of basic research. For example, a chemical compound
3 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
4 Frederick Sanger et al., DNA Sequencing with Chain-TerminatingInhibitors,74 PRoc. NAT'L ACAD.
Sa. 5463 (1977).
5 Allan M. Maxam & Walter Gilbert, A New Methodfor Sequencing DNA, 74 PROC. NAT'LACAD. SC.
560(1977).
6 Stanley N. Cohen et al., Processfor Producing Biologically FunctionalMolecular Chimeras,U.S.
PATENT NO. 4,237,224 (Dec. 2, 1980).
7 See Philippe Ducor, Are Patentsand Research Compatible?,387 NATURE 13 (1997).
8 Rebecca Henderson etaL., Universitiesas a Source ofCommercial Technology: A DetailedAnalysisof
University Patenting 1965-1988 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 5068) (1995)
(documenting how, between 1965 and 1988, the rate of increase of university patenting outpaced the rate of
non-university patenting by a factor of approximately 30 to 1).
9 See, e.g., Kary B. Mullis et al., System forAutomated Performanceof the PolymeraseChainReaction,
U.S. PATENT No. 5,656,493 (Aug. 12, 1997) (currently held by Hoffman-La-Roche) (polymerase chain
reaction technology ("PCR") allows DNA to be replicated rapidly).
10 Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientiftc Research: IntellectualPropertyand the Norms of Science, 94 Nw.
U. L REv. 77, 123 (1999) ("[Slome of the inventions on which patents are being sought are so removed from
commercial application that further basic research will be necessary to identify fully their potential uses.")
(emphasis in original).
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might simultaneously be a highly successful drug and the subject of academic
research. A gene that has been associated with a specific disease might be
used in a commercially lucrative genetic test and at the same time studied in
the laboratory for its possible role in treatment of that disease.
The shift of scientific norms toward acceptance of patenting has occurred
simultaneously with an expansion in the subject matter legally eligible for
patent protection. In the past several decades, the boundaries of patentability
have crept inexorably closer to the basic end of the research spectrum. A
number of developments have contributed to the expansion and strength of
patent law: the creation in 1982 of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit ("CAFC")," which has helped bring jurisprudential
consistency and predictability to patent law;12 the CAFC's willingness to
forms 14
enforce patents; 13 the expansion of proprietary rights to include life
and indeed "everything under the sun that is made by ma ''15 (except
humans); 16 the increasing commercial potential of patented basic biomedical
research results; 17 the existence of a wide array of players in the biomedical
research field, each with its own set of incentives; 18 and the passage of statutes

11See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (relevant
provisions codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
12 Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
24 (1989) ('In sum, the CAFC's jurisprudence reveals that the court has begun to make patent law more
accurate, precise, and coherent.").
13 Lawrence G. Kastriner, The Revival of Confidence in the PatentSystem, 73 J. PAT. [& TADEMARK]
OFF. SOC'Y 5, 10-11 (1991) (observing that CAFC enforcement of the presumption of validity was one of the
first steps taken to materially strengthen the patent grant); Harry F. Manbeck, Jr., The Federal Circuit-First
Ten Years of PatentabilityDecisions, 14 GEO.MASON L. REV. 499, 504 (1992) (stating that the statutory
presumption of validity "has acquired meaning in Federal Circuit jurisprudence").
14 Patents on living subject matter were long considered to violate the principle that products of nature
were not patentable. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). But, in 1980,
the Supreme Court held that genetically-altered organisms could qualify as patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
15 Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 309 (citing S. REP. No. 1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923, at 6 (1952))
(footnote omitted).
16 In 1998, Jeremy Rifkin and Stuart Newman filed a patent application containing claims to animalhuman chimeras. In June 1999, the PTO rejected the application on the grounds that the invention "embraces a
human being." See Rick Weiss, U.S. Ruling Aids Opponents ofPatentsforLife Forms,WASH. POST, June 17,
1999, at A2.
17 Kastriner, supranote 13, at 8 (stating that the CAFC has "significantly enhanced the economic power
of patents").
"

See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INT'ELLECrUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESEARCH TOOLS IN

MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 57 (1997); Report of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Working Group on
Research Tools, Presentedto the Advisory Committee to the Director,June 4, 1998 (visited May 28, 2000)
<http://www.nih.govJnews/researchtoolsindex.htm> ("Report").
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to encourage
patenting of innovations produced by government-sponsored
19
research.

Not all patentees who obtain patents on basic research results will have the
capacity or interest in conducting further research to turn their patented
inventions into commercial end-products. Because applying for (prosecuting)
a patent in the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") is an
expensive and time-consuming process, and because enforcing and defending a
patent can cost patentees millions of dollars in litigation fees, patenting is a
strategic decision. 20 Under the "first to invent" system used in the United
States, the PTO grants patent rights to the applicant who can prove prior
invention, even if that applicant is not the first to file an application to patent
the invention. 21 Independent discovery by a rival does not deprive a rior
inventor of property rights, but may raise the cost of defending the patent.
In order to realize a return on their investment, holders of patents on basic
research results must either develop the product further themselves or license
their patents to downstream innovators who conduct further research to turn it
into a commercial end-product. For example, Human Genome Sciences, Inc.
("HGS") owns a patent on the gene coding for the CCR5 receptor.23 Scientists
24
believe the AIDS virus enters into human cells through the CCR5 receptor.
HGS has licensed several other companies the rights to the CCR5 receptor
patent; with this gene, these25companies will conduct downstream research on
possible therapies for AIDS.
Central to much of the race to obtain patents on basic research results is the
assumption that such patents will be licensed to downstream researchers.
19 See Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-11 (1994); Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 3701-14 (1998).
20 The American Intellectual Property Law Association has estimated that the "cradle to grave" costs of
prosecuting a relatively straightforward patent in the United States range from $14,420 to $23,540. AMERICAN
INTEu.ECruAL PROPERTY ASS'N, AIPLA BuLLETiN 446 (1996).
21 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
22 A priority contest before the PTO to determine which of two applicants was the first to invent is called
an interference. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1994). Interferences are costly. See Donald S. Chisum, The Harmonization
ofInternationalPatentLaw, 26 J. MARsHALL L. REv. 437, 449 (1993).
23 Yi Li et a., Polynucleotides Encoding Human G-Protein Chemokine Receptor HDGNRO, U.S.
PATENT NO. 6,025,154 (Feb. 15, 2000).
24 See Nelson L. Michael etal., The Role of CCR5and CCR2 Polymorphisms in HIV.1 Transmission and
DiseaseProgression,3 NATURE MED. 1160 (1997); Michael U. Smith et al., ContrastingGenetic Influence of
CCR2 and CCR5 Variants on HIV-1 Infection and DiseaseProgression,277 SCIENCE 959 (1997).
25 Human Genome Sciences, Inc,. Press Release, Human Genome Sciences Receives Patent on AIDS
Virus Entry Point, February 16, 2000 (visited May 29, 2000) <http:lwww.hgsi.comlnewslpresslO0-1216_CCR5.html>.
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These users, it is assumed, will conduct further research and create finished
commercial products. If transferring patent rights is easy, then we can expect
patents on basic research to flow seamlessly to downstream innovators. But if
transferring patent rights is not easy, then we can expect hangups and holdouts
to leave patents in the hands of their initial holders when bargaining breaks
down. Patents are licensed all the time, but many transfers, particularly over
basic research results, are not smooth. If bargaining over socially beneficial
transfers of proprietary rights sometimes fails, even when both sides would
like the transfer to occur, it would be useful to figure out why such failures
occur. Understanding how transaction costs affect transfers of transferring
patent rights sheds some light on this problem.
1I.
One of the most influential theories refarding initial rights or entitlements
and their transfer is the Coase Theorem. 6 The Coase Theorem posits that
absent transaction costs, entitlements will be transferred, through private
bargaining, to the users who value them most. Thus, how legal entitlements
are initially distributed in a transaction-cost-free world would be irrelevant for
efficiency purposes. 28 But when transaction costs exist, as they most certainly
do in reality, then this result does not hold.2 9 As Guido Calabresi and A.
Douglas Melamed point out, the Coase Theorem's heroic assumption of no
transaction costs "must be understood extremely broadly as involving both
perfect knowledge and the absence of any impediments or costs of
negotiating. '30 The Coase Theorem, therefore, underscores the important role
31
transaction costs play in driving the exchange of property rights.
Transaction costs are composed of many elements. In the context of
licensing a patent they include: the costs of searching for licensees by the
26 What later came to be called the Coase Theorem originally appeared in R.H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see generally Robert D. Cooter, Coase Theorem, in 1 THE NEW
PALGRAVE: A DICIONARY Op ECONOMICS 457,458 (John Eatwell et a. eds., 1987).
27 Coase, supra note 26, at 15 ("Such a rearrangement of rights will always take place if it would lead to
an increase in the value of production.").
28 id
29 id.("Tie argument has proceeded up to this point on the assumption ...that there were no costs
involved in carrying out market transactions. This is, of course, a very unrealistic assumption."); Richard A.
Epstein, A ClearView of The Cathedral:The Dominanceof PropertyRules, 106 YALE J. 2091, 2092 (1997)
("[O]ur world is not one in which transaction costs are zero. Rather, they are positive and large... :).
30 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1094-95 (1972).
31 See THRAINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSITUT=ONS 105 (1990) ("Coase's main
contribution ...was to arouse our awareness of the implications of positive transaction costs.").
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patent holder or licensors by the would-be licensee; the costs of negotiating a
license, sometimes with multiple licensees or patent holders; and the costs of
enforcing the terms of the license and protecting against infringement by
nonlicensees.
The search costs of patent licensing should not be underestimated.
Downstream innovators must determine what licensing rights they need to
obtain, from whom they must obtain them, and how to contact the patent
holders. The secrecy procedures surrounding patent applications do not lower
these search costs. The PTO keeps patent applications secret until they are
issued, or for eighteen months under some circumstances. 32 Thus, unless an
applicant chooses to make public the fact that it has applied for a patent,
potential licensees will not know that an application is pending. This makes it
difficult for downstream innovators to know, ex ante, that a patent will be
issuing for which they will desire-or need, if they are competitors who lose
the race to the patent office-a license.
The transaction costs of negotiating a license are not insignificant, either.
Innumerable variables must be addressed. How many, and which, of the
licensee's employees may use the licensed product? If the licensee is a nonprofit organization, may it use the licensed material for commercial purposes?
May it use the licensed material in research sponsored by another
organization? Patentees may insist upon licensing the patent only for use in a
particular experiment or study specifically described in the licensing
agreement.33 When the patent covers an invention from which many further
inventions can be derived, patentees frequently want to reserve rights, known
as "reach-through" rights, in future discoveries made by the licensee. Whether
the patentee will have outright property rights to future discoveries, or whether
it will merely have use rights (a license), or whether it will have no rights at all
can be a hotly-contested issue. Downstream innovators negotiating with
multiple patentees may find themselves faced with a multiplicity of such
"reach-through" demands. Reach-through provisions in a single license are
burdensome enough; but multiple reach-through provisions can conflict with
each other or may be virtually impossible for the licensee to satisfy. In the
32 See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1994), amended by 35 U.S.C.A. § 122(a) (West Supp. 2000). The PTO publishes
a pending patent application 18 months after it is filed in the United States if the patentee has sought to patent
the same invention in another country that requires publication of pending patent applications 18 months after
filing. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1994), amended by 35 U.S.C.A. § 122(b) (West Supp. 2000). The term of patent
protection begins on the issue date and ends 20 years from the date the inventor filed the application. 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994).
33 Report, supranote 18.
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context of licensing research tools, the same provisions tend to give rise to
conflict again and again. 34 Because transaction costs reduce the surplus that
would be gained from a license, their very existence can deter patent holders
and would-be licensees from negotiating.
Sometimes the transaction costs associated with licensing patents on basic
research results can be so high that what was expected to be a straightforward
licensing negotiation either drags on for an extended length of time or fails
altogether. 35 Another cause of licensing failure can be the impatience of downstream researchers with the licensing process and their unfamiliarity with the
intricacies of legal language. As the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Working Group on Research Tools has concluded, "[mlost scientists are not skilled
at reading license agreements and distilling the legal implications of their
36
language, even in consultation with their own institutional representatives."
One thing is clear: there are no hard-and-fast rules.
When a downstream innovator needs to collect more than one license in
order to conduct further research, its transaction costs increase dramatically.37
For example, a pharmaceutical company interested in developing a commercial
treatment for a genetic disease may have to take out licenses on multiple gene
fragments, known as expressed sequence tags ("ESTs"), each of which may be
owned by a different entity. As Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg argue
in the context of biomedical research, a thicket of patent rights on upstream
discoveries may magnify transaction costs to the point of stifling downstream
development and commercialization. 38 When proprietary rights to a resource
are carved up into pieces too small to be aggregated easily, they 3argue, this
creates an "anticommons" that results in underuse of the resource. 9 Drafting
multiples licenses may or may not lead to economies of scale. When
institutions holding patents on basic research results want to license their
patents to multiple licensees, they are faced with the choice either of
constructing a single licensing agreement that fits all comers like a Procrustean
bed (which may reduce licensing revenues and increase negotiation costs) or of
34 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Streamlining the Transferof ResearchTools, 74(6) AcAD. MED. 683 (June
1999) (describing some of the provisions that lead to bargaining breakdown).
35 Report, supra note 18.
36 id.

37 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.Eisenberg, Can PatentsDeter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998).
38 See id.
39 Id. at 698-99. See also Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticonmnons: Property in the
Transitionfrom Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REV. 621, 677 (1998) (arguing that a tragedy of the anticommons can occur when too many individuals have rights of exclusion in a scarce resource).
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crafting licensing agreements tailored to each negotiation (which will be more
costly to draft). Either way, the result is the same: negotiation is costly.
Just because there is a large number of licenses to be negotiated or multiple
players involved in the transaction does not mean that bargaining failure will
occur, of course. Some commentators have argued that the presence of high
transaction costs encourages both patent holders and would-be licensees to
41
invest in institutions that lower the cost of certain types of exchanges.
Various industries have developed institutional responses over time, such as
the ASCAP copyright collective and the MPEG-2 compression technology
patent pool, to mitigate some of the obstacles to successful licensing
transactions. 42
And let us not forget that most flagrant aspect of patent costsenforcement. The 'direct costs of enforcing patents and licenses are well
documented.43 The perception of potential litigation creates significant costs
as well. One study has shown that the cost of intellectual property litigation
plays a major role in driving the research plans of more than half of the
corporations with less than 500 employees, and is a significant concern for
one-third of larger businesses. 44 Enforcement of proprietary rights has indirect
costs as well. Discovery imposes significant opportunity costs on managers,
executives, and researchers. The mere announcement of an infringement suit
has costs for patent holders and alleged infringers alike. News reports of the
filing of a patent infringement suit have been shown to cause both the patent
holder's and the alleged infringer's firm values to drop. 45 Finally, avoidance
costs are positive. Entities have an "affirmative duty to exercise due care to

40 See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of improvement in IntellectualPropertyLaw, 75 Tx. L. REV.
989, 1053 (1997).
41 See Robert P. Merges, ContractingInto LiabilityRules: IntellectualProperty Rights and Collective
Rights Organizations,84 CALIF. L. REv. 1293, 1294 (1996).
42 See id,
at 1329-43.
45 Jean Olson Lanjouw, Economic Consequences of a Changing Litigation Environment: The Case of
Patents(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4835) (1994).
44 ld.
45 See Josh Lemer, Patentingin the Shadow of Competitors,38 J.L. & ECON. 463,470 (1995) (showing
that the market-adjusted combined capitalization of plaintiff and defendant in the sample presented fell an
average of 2.0% in the two-day window ending on the day that news of the infringement filing appeared in the
Wall Street Journal). See also Sanjai Bhagat etal., The Costs of Inefficient Bargainingand Financial
Distress:Evidence from CorporateLawsuits, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 221 (1994) (showing that the market-adjusted
combined capitalization of plaintiff and defendant in the sample presented fell an average of 3.1% in the same
two-day window).
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determine whether or not [they are] infringing" other firms' patents.46 Willful
infringement can lead to enhanced damages 47 and attorney's fees.48
To date, legal scholars have discussed extensively the relevance of
transaction costs to allocations of proprietary rights generally.4 9 Some scholars
have applied this analysis to intellectual property specifically, discussing the
50
presence
ofintellectual
search costs,
costs, 1 and enforcement costs5 2
surrounding
propertybargaining
rights.
But bargaining between patent holders and would-be licensees can break
down for a host of reasons, not all of which have to do with transaction costs.
Empirical studies of different industries-including electric lighting,
automobiles, airplanes, and radio-reveal many cases in which the holder of a
patent that was the key to downstream products was unable to negotiate
licenses with downstream innovators to coordinate further development of the
basic invention. 53 The characteristics of patents on basic research indicate that
they, too, may be another area in which we can expect frequent bargaining
breakdown. To understand why, I want to focus on another factor, often
overlooked in the literature, that is particularly important when patent rights on
basic research are changing hands: uncertainty.
El.
Risk involves predictable probabilities of a future event occurring, whereas
uncertainty involves unpredictable probabilities.5 4 Licensees can assess the
risk associated with further research and development of a basic invention and
negotiate licensing fees accordingly. But when the patented invention is so
basic that the downstream uses are unknown and unknowable-i.e., when they

46 Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
47 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994).
48 See id. § 285.
49 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules,and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV.1089 (1972); Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, PropertyRules
Versus LiabilityRules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARv. L. REV. 713 (1996).
50 See Lemley, supranote 40.
51 See Heller & Eisenberg, supranote 37.
52 See Lerner, supra note 45 (examining the patenting behavior of firms with various levels of litigation
costs).

51 See RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIoNARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE
255-62 (1982); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economies of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 885-91 (1990).
54 See FRANKKNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTYAND PROFrr 197-263 (1921).
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are uncertain-then would-be licensees and patentees will have difficulty
bargaining over the transfer of proprietary rights.
The closer an invention gets to the basic end of the research spectrum, the
greater the uncertainty about the future value and commercial uses of that
invention.5 5 For example, a patent may exist on a fragment of a gene although
the function of that gene fragment is unknown; the sequence and function of
the entire gene of which that fragment is a part is unknown; the ways in which
that gene can malfunction are unknown; the diseases that arise when the gene
malfunctions are unknown; and the pharmaceutical compound that can combat
the disease that arises when the gene (of which the gene fragment is but a part)
malfunctions is unknown. In this string of unknowns, it is discovering and
patenting the last that is commercially lucrative. When all that is known is the
sequence data surrounding the gene fragment, the future value of a patent on
the gene fragment is difficult for the patent holder and the would-be licensee to
predict and even more difficult for both to agree upon.
Let me make clear what the problem is not. I am not referring to
bargaining breakdown that occurs under full or near-full information because
the parties place different subjective values on the patent.
Nor is the problem to which I refer one of inequitable conduct in which
patentees deliberately withhold information regarding how to make or
reproduce the invention. Patentees know, ex ante, that a valuable patent will
be carefully pored over by competitors. The patent laws require that patentees
reveal as part of the patent "a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise and
exact terms" as to enable others to recreate the invention. 56 Patent applicants
who attempt to withhold vital information about the invention from their
applications, in the hopes of de facto extending protection
57 after the statutory
period, run the risk of having their patents invalidated. If competitors believe
the invention is not fully disclosed in the patent, they can challenge the validity
of the patent. If the PTO or the CAFC concludes that the patent holder misled
the PTO when filing the application, such as by hiding relevant information,
then the PTO or the court will invalidate the entire patent. The punishment is
sufficiently disproportionate to the value of the information withheld that
55 Innovation is often not a linear process. See Clarisa Long, Patents and Cumulative Innovation, 2
WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 229 (2000). Nonetheless, conceptualizing research as ranging along a spectrum from

basic research at one end to applied research at the other is a useful construct.
56 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
57 See 37 C.R. § 1.56 (1999).
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successful inequitable conduct actions are rare. The anticipated value of the
patent, therefore, is directly correlated to the incentive to act honestly when
submitting the patent application. The greater the anticipated stream of future
revenue, the greater the incentive for the patentee to be scrupulously honest
and reveal all relevant information.
The problem is not one of informational asymmetry either, in which one
party to a transaction knows valuable information that it withholds from other
parties to a transaction. For example, if a downstream innovator believes the
benefits from entering into a particular licensing transaction will be very high,
it has no incentive to reveal the full extent of the benefit, lest the patent holder
increase its demanded share of revenue. While informational asymmetry raises
transaction costs and may contribute to bargaining breakdown, it is a
phenomenon different from the one I have in mind.
Rather, I am referring to a severe and intractable lack of knowledge by all
parties to the transaction regarding the fundamental value of the resource
changing hands. In this situation, even if each side reveals all the relevant
information available to it, the uncertainty surrounding the future value of the
invention is still high. Some licenses will prove to be worth a large licensing
fee; most will not.
Innovation is cumulative, and upstream patent holders have greater
bargaining power than downstream would-be licensees. In the event of
licensing breakdown, a holder of a patent on basic research results can, if it has
sufficient resources and inclination, attempt to develop the basic research
results into a commercial product. A would-be licensee, however, does not
have this option if bargaining fails. It must either look for a substitute product
to license or attempt to work around the patent. Imagine the scenario in which
downstream innovators will contribute most of the value of a consumer endproduct such as a pharmaceutical compound. In order to turn basic research
results patented by upstream innovators into the consumer product, the
downstream innovators would have to take out licenses on all the underlying
patented basic research results, often from more than one patentee. But
because patents are subject to property rules rather than liability rules, even
under circumstances (such as bilateral monopoly) where liability rules would
be more efficient, the first patent holder
in line has the power to hold up the
58
entire downstream chain of research.

58 A compulsory licensing regime, by imposing a liability rule, can alleviate the holdout problem. But
commentators have argued that compulsory licensing, and indeed imposition of liability rules in intellectual
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The greater the uncertainty surrounding the future value of the patent, the
greater the likelihood that various biases will influence the outcome of the
negotiation. A patent holder may overvalue the patent, believing that it
represents the linchpin of the next great blockbuster invention. 59 When the
contribution of multiple parties to a joint endeavor are cumulative, each may
overestimate
its own contribution and underestimate the contribution of the
60
others.

Despite such uncertainty and the concomitant biases that creep into the
negotiating process, patents are licensed all the time-even patents on basic
research results. How do the underlying patents get valued? In this highly
subjective process, proxies are frequently used to determine the patent's
anticipated value, importance, and strength. Such proxies include the size of
the patent holder's portfolio, the licensing fees the patentee has received from
licensing other patents, the amount of venture capital financing the patentee
has been able to attract, and the litigiousness (or expected litigiousness) of the
patent holder, to name a few.
Like all proxies, these are helpful if imperfect. Patentees with large
portfolios are more likely to be repeat players and thus have a better bargaining
position than patentees who possess only one or a few patents. The stronger its
bargaining position, the greater the rents the patentee can expect to extract
from licensees. Among other things, the size of the patent holder's portfolio
signals the degree to which the patent holder is willing to devote scarce
resources to obtaining proprietary rights, which in turn can signal the patent
holder's confidence in its research results and its beliefs about the development
potential of its inventions. Because a firm tends to receive multiple patents
clustering around the same technology, the licensing fees a patentee receives
from licensing other patents can be interpreted as a signal of the assessment of
competitors of the would-be licensee of the value of the patentee's technology.
The same analysis holds true when the amount of venture capital financing the
patentee has been able to attract is used as a proxy: if investors are willing to
property cases generally, would be inefficient to the extent that parties would contract into liability rules
themselves. See Merges, supra note 41, at 1296.
59 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 701.
60 A similar phenomenon can be found in the domestic relations literature. For example, studies show
that spouses tend to overestimate their contribution to household tasks. Erik Olin Wright et al., The NonEffects of Class on the GenderDivision of Labor in the Home, 6 GENDER & Soc'Y 253,260 (1992); see also
Julie E. Press & Eleanor Townsley, Wives' and Husbands' Housework Reporting, 12 GENDER & SOC'Y 188,
203, 208-09 (1998). The existence and measurement of cognitive biases, however, is subject to dispute. See,
e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer, How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear:Beyond "Heuristicsand Biases," 2 EUR.
REV. Soc. PSYCHOL. 83 (1991).
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support a company, assume the would-be licensees, then its technology must
be worth something. (Interestingly, the relationship between venture capital
funding and patenting seems to be a feedback loop.) 1 The litigiousness of the
patent holder signals its competitive ferocity and how important it believes its
proprietary rights to be. A patent holder has an incentive not to engage in
litigation defending a patent when it anticipates that the costs of the defense
will be greater than the expected profits and damages from the infringed
patent. On the other hand, a patent holder may want to enforce a particular
patent, even when enforcement is more costly than the anticipated gains,
because sending a signal that the patent holder is willing to lose money
defending its rights may deter would-be infringers of other patents and prove
to be efficient in the long run. None of these proxies, either individually or
taken together, however, provides a means of valuing the patented technology
accurately.
If these proxies are so imperfect, then why don't downstream innovators
negotiate licensing terms that allow them to innovate first, and pay later? In
other words, wouldn't downstream innovators want to craft licensing terms
that allowed them to pay only after downstream research on a patented basic
invention had revealed its commercial value? In practice, such terms are rarely
used. This is partly due to the fact that if licensing fees must be paid sooner or
later, rational patent holders would prefer to be paid a determined amount
sooner rather than an undetermined amount later. (Remember that if the
parties to the transaction could determine the probability of success of the
future research and discount accordingly, there would be no need to defer
payment.) Rational licensees would prefer to negotiate a licensing amount
sooner rather than later, so as to fix one more variable in their downstream
research risk equation. Licensees must subtract the cost of the license from the
profitability of the commercial end-product and thus will be willing to pay
only if they anticipate that the cost of the license will allow a sufficient return
on investment. No innovator wants to be in the position of having to pay
licensing fees, however small, for the use of a patent that turned out to be a
dud. And no patent holder wants to hear that it will not be receiving licensing
revenues because its patent turned out to be one of the majority of patents that
ultimately is not commercially viable.

61 See Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Does Venture Capital Spur Innovation? (National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper No. W6846) (1998) (demonstrating that a positive correlation exists
between venture capital activity and patenting).
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The expansion of patentable subject matter closer to the basic end of the
research spectrum promises to exacerbate the valuation problem. If licensing
attempts fail, the would-be licensee can only attempt to work around the patent
or look for a substitute product on which to take out a license. But the initial
rights holder, if sufficiently capitalized, has the option of conducting the
downstream research and development necessary to turn the patented research
results into a commercial product. Alternatively, an initial rights holder that is
unable to conduct the downstream innovation necessary to turn basic research
results into a commercial product may be more dependent on licensing
revenues, and thus more eager to avoid bargaining breakdown, than one that is
not so dependent. Different sets of incentives will apply under different
circumstances; the characteristics and preferences of initial rights holders help
determine whether or not attempts to transfer proprietary rights to basic
research ultimately are successful. As the number of patents on basic research
results increases, we can expect the frequency of bargaining breakdown over
these resources likewise to increase. Whenever negotiating licensing terms to
basic research results breaks down, valuable time is lost. The problem will be
most acute when the entities patenting the basic research results do not have
the capital to develop the patented material and have no further use for it
except as a source of licensing revenue.
If both parties to a licensing transaction are equally ignorant of whether a
patented basic research result can be turned into something that has a viable
commercial use, then ought we to grant proprietary rights to basic research
results at all? Determining whether proprietary rights ought to be granted for
basic research results is well beyond the ambitions of this Article. Instead, my
intent is to suggest that we need to focus more closely on the uncertainty
surrounding basic research results as one of the factors that leads to bargaining
breakdown. Analyzing licensing transactions of basic research through the
lens of uncertainty can help us to understand better the causes behind at least
some instances of licensing breakdown. If proxies are used as a substitute for
analysis of the scientific merits of the patented invention, then it would be
helpful to know which proxies are used and when, to what extent they are
useful and why, and the circumstances under which they are useful. With
uncertainty and the proxies used to value basic research as our focus, we can
then explore how to create mechanisms that will allow for the smooth transfer
of proprietary rights from initial rights holders to downstream innovators. At
the very least, we can examine the barriers that prevent transfers from
occurring and focus our attention on lowering them.

